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1. Economic and cultural globalisation
The Brussels Capital Region has experienced a significant period of economic 
growth over the past few decades. The service sector has been particularly respon-
sible for this economic performance, largely comprising the European, federal and 
regional administrations. However, overseas investments in the service sector have 
also been an important factor. In broad terms, Brussels has 2000 foreign compa-
nies, which account for 234,000 jobs and 40% of the Brussels GDP. Over the past 
few years, people in the Halle-Vilvoorde and Nijvel arrondissements have benefitted 
more from the Brussels-effect than those actually in Brussels. The economic growth 
in Brussels between 1995 and 2005 measured 2.2% (higher than in both Flanders 
and Wallonia); in Vilvoorde it was 2.9% and in Nijvel it even reached 4%.
This economic success can also be seen in a population growth that stems from 
immigration, making Brussels the most global city in Belgium, in terms of its popula-
tion. Around 30% of the population have a different nationality than the Belgian na-
tionality (and a further 20% of Brussels residents have swapped their original nation-
ality for the Belgian nationality). Just as in the majority of cities in Flanders, Brussels 
immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon and the foreign population has grown 
strongly since the 1960s. The foreigners in Brussels are mainly the result of various 
waves of post-war immigration. It is estimated that there are currently around 170 
nationalities within the Brussels area.
Each expansion of the EU sees highly-skilled people from the new countries arriving 
to join the ranks of EU officials and bringing a whole community in their wake. The 
larger Europe becomes, the greater the attraction of the city is for important eco-
nomic actors, whether leaders and executives of multinational companies, or spe-
cialised services for companies that operate in the world economy and are based in 
Brussels in order to manage their European activities.
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The other side of the social spectrum used to be dominated by the migrant workers 
of the 1960s and 1970s, who in turn replaced low-skilled Belgian workers. Many of 
these migrants have not had the chance to help their children climb the social lad-
der, as the crisis of the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s prevented them 
from doing so. However, since the 1990s they have been joined by a new wave of 
migrants who this time come from all over the world and who stay here illegally, 
temporarily or permanently and who often seek an income through informal activi-
ties. They often end up in activity sectors where common strategies for keeping 
prices low, such as mechanisation or delocalisation to low-wage countries are not 
possible and where the solution is found in the search for informal and low-paid 
labour (e.g. in the construction, catering, cleaning and transport sectors, etc). These 
sectors also experienced a boom through the growth of the Brussels economy (for 
instance, in the construction and maintenance of offices, the growth of the catering 
sector through the increase in tourism and wealthy knowledge workers, etc).
2. Polarisation or open society?
a. Socio-economic change: polarisation between high and low income groups?
Despite the large welfare production and international attractiveness of Brussels, the 
city has also experienced serious socio-economic problems. The unemployment 
level, which has hovered around the 20% mark over the past few years, is extremely 
high. The average family income decreased from 160% of the national average in 
1963 to only 85% in 2005. Such changes conceal distinct internal contrasts. While 
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one in four residents of Brussels lives under the poverty line, Brussels is also home 
to a growing, well-paid transnational elite estimated to account for between 10% 
and 15% of the population. The gap between these different income groups is 
growing and the absolute purchasing power of the poorest is decreasing. This is 
shown in the graph below, which indicates the division of the taxable incomes in 
constant prices per decile.
There is a growing disparity between the highest and the lowest incomes since the 
end of the 1980s. The gap remained stable during the better economic spell be-
tween 1988 and 1991, but continued to grow again from 1992 onwards (due to 
changes in the tax law, there are gaps in the series so new index years have had to 
be taken). The purchasing power of the lowest 10% decreased at the end of the 
1980s and has continued to do so since 1992. Tax fraud and the informal economy 
are perhaps the most important factors in creating the disparity between the figures 
and the actual situation; however the historical trends that the graph shows are 
nevertheless alarming.
b. Socio-spatial inequalities on different scale levels
The internal socio-spatial polarisation in the Brussels city region is greater than 
elsewhere in Belgium: the Brussels city region has the municipality with the lowest 
average taxable income per tax return (Sint-Joost-ten-Node) and the municipality 
that was the richest for sev-
eral years and still now ranks 
amongst the richest (Lasne). 
In 1993, the average taxable 
income per taxpayer for Sint-
Joost was only 48,4% that of 
Lasne. In 2005, it dropped to 
42.6%. The difference be-
tween these two municipali-
ties, one in the city centre, the 
other in the periphery, is not 
just coincidental. Urban 
growth has mainly taken 
place in the suburban belt 
over the past 50 years and 
has been socially selective. 
The new houses in the pe-
riphery (largely outside the 
Brussels Capital Region) were 
erected for the middle and 
higher classes, enabling them 
to leave the city centre. The 
lower income groups were left 
behind in the city centre. To a 
large extent, the various im-
migration waves also followed 
this pattern: rich immigrants 
settled in the periphery, mainly 
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EVOLUTION OF TOTAL TAXABLE INCOME 1976 - 2005
1976 = 100 Constant prices of 2004
in the east; poorer migrants ended up in the westerly working-class districts, the 
‘poor crescent’ of Brussels.
The spatial distribution of the total taxable income per municipality in the city region 
shows the result of this process. Due to the selective character of suburbanisation, 
the population decrease and the economic crisis, the global incomes of the total 
population in the central municipalities of the Brussels Capital Region have almost 
seen no increase over the past 30 years, whilst the municipalities in the periphery of 
the city region (mainly in the south-east) have been able to triple this wealth (the 
policy consequences of this will be examined further on).
This pattern has recently been disturbed by gentrification. New types of households, 
often young double-earners or young transnational knowledge workers, choose to 
settle in centrally-located neighbourhoods with attractive housing and an attractive 
public area. In certain neighbourhoods, this has led to a new social mix, whilst in 
others this has increased the elitist character of the neighbourhood. In all cases, 
gentrification and the population growth of the Region compound the price in-
creases on the housing market and in the local retail outlets, making it increasingly 
difficult for the lowest income groups to find decent housing, which results in slum-
lords and homelessness.
The existing segregation also mirrors the spatially differentiated access to the em-
ployment market. The Brussels economy is strongly dependent on the contribution 
of mainly highly-skilled external workers from Flanders (230,000 in 2006) and Wallo-
nia (126,000). The Brussels residents often do not possess the required qualifica-
tions and command of languages for the jobs that Brussels and the surrounding 
area create as a capital city and European centre (98% of unemployed people in 
Brussels are monolingual – mostly French-speaking – and for that reason alone, 
they are refused jobs in the city’s demanding international economy or in the sur-
rounding Dutch-speaking areas). A job in the periphery is also often very difficult to 
reach from the city centre using public transport.
The jobs that remain offer disproportionate prospects on insecure and low incomes. 
Temporary work increased by almost 200% in the Brussels Capital Region from 
4.3% of paid work in 1992 to 12.6% in 2006, whilst this share only increased by 
77% for the country over the same period. Temporary work is highly sensitive to 
economic fluctuations and therefore offers little security of income. 
c. Multicultural Brussels: inclusion or conflict?
The fast diversification of the Brussels population altered the character of the city 
considerably. The foreign population in Brussels comes from all over and comprises 
((grand) children of) earlier guest workers, Euro officials, multinational expats, refu-
gees and illegal immigrants; some of whom are extremely rich and some extremely 
poor. This diversity leads to problems and conflicts including mutual racism and 
discrimination, riots and other expressions of abhorrence towards “the other”; origin 
and colour also seem to have a significant influence on the opportunities for climb-
ing the social ladder.
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The inclusion of all these different groups in a common urban project is no simple 
challenge for the future. The one-sided vision on the ‘integration’ of guest workers in 
and by a Belgian francophone middle-class-determined society from the 1970s to 
the 1990s is no longer appropriate. Brussels is evolving towards a multifaceted di-
versity where adjusting to the multicultural reality is becoming a more realistic per-
spective than adapting to a monocultural host city. At the same time, the noncom-
mittal way in which integration is being dealt with in Brussels is also dangerous. 
Having no duty to integrate is actually the same as not having compulsory education 
in the sense that the weakest groups are deprived of chances to work their way up 
in society. Furthermore, there is also the threat of the spectre of communitarisation: 
in all this diversity, how do you maintain a shared ‘imagined community’ that makes 
mutual solidarity possible and prevents groups from voluntarily shutting themselves 
off from repression or calling for repression against others?
d. Towards a repressive welfare state?
After the Second World War, Belgium developed an extensive welfare state with a 
social security system that, up to the end of the 1970s, had the ambition of eradi-
cating poverty in society. Today, this ambition is needed more than ever as Brussels 
has so far not succeeded in guaranteeing decent housing for everyone. The pres-
sure on the housing market mainly affects the lower realms of society and requires 
large-scale investments in the social rented sector; however, social housing policy 
continues to lag behind. 
Brussels education policy is also no longer able to create more social equality. Both 
Flemish and French-speaking education score very badly in international compari-
sons when it comes to offering equal opportunities (PISA comparison) and therefore 
form an important factor in reproducing inequalities in Brussels society. This is dam-
aging for the future, especially in an immigration city such as Brussels, where thou-
sands of young newcomers arrive each year requiring extra efforts to be made.
Where the efforts in Brussels for combating social inequalities are thin on the 
ground, it seems that investments in repressing weaker groups increase. The home-
less in the consumer-based city centre are deported to Neder-over-Heembeek and 
illegal immigrants are not even safe from the Department of Federal Immigration on 
public transport. The seemingly legitimate demand for public order from prosperous 
groups that are returning to the city centre is increasingly being aimed at the pres-
ence and the objectionable behaviour of certain groups (allochtonous youngsters, 
the homeless and street prostitutes).
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels
 5
Chr. Kesteloot, M. Loopmans, “Citizens’ forum of Brussels. Social inequalities”,
Brussels Studies, Synopsis nr. 16, 3 March 2009.
II. Questions-issues
1. Which policy?
The main problem therefore consists in significantly decreasing the social inequali-
ties to a level where each inhabitant of the city has the guarantee of being able to 
live in a decent way. This is a question of social justice that the city should be able to 
guarantee to all its inhabitants, in the first instance comprising decent affordable 
housing, access to an income that provides decent food, clothing and household 
goods (or direct access to these means of existence), access to decent healthcare, 
education, culture and mobility.
a. Integration through the market?
These living conditions are primarily assured in our capitalistic society through ac-
cess to the employment market and remuneration for the work done that is high 
enough to provide the required income security. However, even in one of the most 
competitive regions of the world economy, the employment market offers no guar-
antee for improving the fate of the poorest population, nor does it guarantee quick 
integration and the upward social mobility of newcomers to the urban Community.
b. Integration through reciprocity?
Other paths do exist for combatting social inequality. Direct mutual solidarity and 
reciprocal help between people via social networks is a matter of life and death for 
some in our society. In order to make this reciprocity possible, people try to live in 
the vicinity of their family and ethnic groups remain living together. It is no coinci-
dence that this has been the reason why all sorts of initiatives have also focussed on 
the structure of society and social cohesion. However, social networks do not bring 
universal happiness. Mutual solidarity is conditional and limited to members of the 
network; people who are in need of solidarity within their network do not always 
have much room for negotiation in exacting this solidarity. Furthermore, social net-
works are often intrinsically linked with identitarian processes which often make 
them socially selective, which in turn excludes the weakest groups from the strong-
est networks.
c. Integration thanks to the government?
The government’s redistribution policy, particularly in the construction of the welfare 
state in the previous century, is a more extensive alternative. By levying taxes and 
collecting social security contributions, the government centralises part of the pro-
duced wealth and distributes it once again according to politically-determined rules. 
The most important instruments in this are the (increasingly less) progressive tax 
rates, the social security that provides supplementary or substitute incomes and 
access in kind (mainly for healthcare, but also for housing in some countries) on the 
basis of the collected contributions from employees and employers and/or taxes. 
The government is also able to act in a regulatory way on the employment market in 
an attempt to steer the division of incomes at the source: possible ways include 
monitoring discrimination, stimulating jobs for groups that have little chance on the 
market (e.g. the low-skilled), but also regulating working time, the level of the wages 
and working conditions. Finally, the government also takes care of a number of col-
lective consumer goods and services: information, communication and transport 
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resources, trade, schooling and training, culture, recreational infrastructure, safety 
and healthcare.
2. On which levels?
The government’s redistribution task is organised on different levels. The debate 
about which task is best handled at which level is both complex and age-old, and is 
also often embroiled in communautaire issues in Belgium. The question here is 
which role the Brussels governments can play in this jumble.
The regulation of the employment market is under much pressure: cities and nation-
states are played off against each other as competitors and are left with little room 
to put forward social needs in employment market policies. Another way could be to 
extend the European level, because this level still transcends the logic of competi-
tion to some extent, but pressure from below is needed for this; from the city, where 
the tension between competition and solidarity is the most tangible. In order to 
make Brussels more social, it needs to join together with other cities in unambigu-
ously pleading for a more social Europe. The same issues arise on the level of social 
security, which has historically been developed on the level of the national state. 
Regions (not only Flanders) are demanding to have more of an impact on social 
security so that redistribution flows can be directed into their own competition strat-
egy. With a low employment level of city inhabitants, a large number of commuters 
and high levels of unemployment, this is not a beneficial path for Brussels to take. 
Should Brussels not rather plead for this redistribution system to be raised to the 
European level, making it a core element of social Europe?
The city is traditionally the locus of collective consumption. However, Brussels is 
confronted here with a double field of tension. The city’s care hinterland extends 
beyond the Region’s administrative borders, roughly corresponding to the regional 
employment basin. However, because the financing of this service is largely done 
through the Region and the Brussels municipalities, many users (the commuters) 
contribute less to its financing. External financing (which is not exclusively borne by 
the commuters) is only for ‘personal matters’ (from the communities) and from spe-
cific funds such as Beliris or the Grootstedenbeleid (from the federal government).
On the other hand, tension surrounds internal redistribution: which Brussels resi-
dents benefit from collective consumption? The problem of the Brussels municipali-
ties arises here. There are 19th century working-class districts from the first belt as 
well as more prosperous districts from the second belt in the majority of the munici-
palities; there are social housing estates and private residential neighbourhoods. It 
should be evident that the necessary solidarity is developed on this level and that 
the municipal policy relating to collective consumption therefore works in a redis-
tributive manner. The problem is more that municipalities have good reasons for 
taking other paths than that of solidarity. The Brussels municipalities are competitors 
in fiscal terms and use housing policy and spatial planning to pass on the poorest 
inhabitants to one another and to attract the richer inhabitants (a sort of spatial 
Blame Game). By attracting people with high-end jobs and elbowing out people 
with low-end jobs, an attempt is also being made to increase the value of property. 
This enables the municipalities to increase their incomes from the supplementary 
taxes on the income tax and also on the property tax. In this context, urban renewal 
is usually an operation that provides benefits on both levels. Gentrification in one’s 
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own territory is a desirable evolution, whilst the addition of new social housing is 
avoided like the plague. The question is therefore one of how the fiscal competition 
between municipalities can be changed into distributive justice. This would involve 
poorer municipalities receiving more resources, and also that these resources are 
actually used in tackling the inequality and not for improving their competitive posi-
tion.
The municipalities, the Region, the Brussels hinterland, Belgium and Europe are all 
involved in the battle against social inequality in the city. It all boils down to allowing 
these different levels to work together and to prevent competition emerging within 
and between these different levels.
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III. Policy options
1. Institutional changes as politics of scale for the poor?
As the production of wealth is extensive enough in Brussels, the question is one of 
how this wealth can be fairly distributed across the population. This redistribution 
can not be viewed in isolation from the institutional structure of the Belgian state. So 
what are the institutional paths that can now be taken for achieving fairer redistribu-
tion?
a. Increasing the size of the region?
The call for increasing the city region is great as this would mean that the expense 
of collective consumption could also be carried by the broad shoulders in the pe-
riphery. The realisation of an institutional city region is not simple and is a source of 
political ideological conflicts. This is increasingly hampered in a Belgian context due 
to the communautarian issues. However, the most important question is whether 
this will counteract socio-economic polarisation. Even if the resources available to 
Brussels were to increase, then there is still no guarantee that these increased re-
sources would actually be used to close the social gap in Brussels. An expansion of 
the city region would also primarily involve an extension of the political power that 
the rich suburban citizens have over the centre. In terms of spatial planning, mobility, 
trade and investments, political parties that are also popular within the rich periphery 
of Brussels, have so far utilised the Brussels resources more in favour of the city 
users than those who actually live there. Instead of using redistribution, socio-
economic tensions are mainly combatted through repression.
This does not do away with the fact that it is essential to hold the city users partly 
responsible for the city’s future; firstly by obliging them to contribute to the costs of 
the collective consumption that they benefit from in the city and to compensate 
them with a vote in the matters that concern them in the city. In a more structural 
way, the integration of city users within the urban community demands umbrella 
institutions within which people can negotiate with each other about the future of 
the city, from three structural interest positions: the poor and the newcomers who 
live in the central area of the city, the Brussels middle-class who reside in the better 
(parts of) the Brussels municipalities and the city users.
b. Making the municipalities smaller?
An alternative to the expansion of Brussels is the preservation or even contraction of 
the Region in order to create a really urban region. This would at least make the 
poverty visible – and not concealed by averages that ignore the internal differences. 
Furthermore, poor city residents would be given a say in the institutions that are 
their mouthpiece, through which they can develop and defend their interests and 
requirements. Perhaps this would enable redistribution from the Brussels suburbs to 
the Brussels Region to be enforced; for example through local taxes that are partly 
paid at the place of work instead of at the place of residence. The same reasoning is 
also valid for the internal municipal differences. If we were to have around 30 homo-
geneous clearly-defined municipalities in Brussels, then as well as Sint-Joost-ten-
Node, there would be another fifteen that could epitomize and defend the interests 
of the poor. The central districts and the most vulnerable inhabitants in the Region 
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would be supported on three levels: internally, the political representatives would 
find it necessary to take account of the population without a vote as this is the larg-
est group; the problems of the central neighbourhoods would be represented more 
strongly at the level of the region and also on a federal level; new local politicians 
would build up expertise in defending these interests; finally, because of the (weak) 
solidarity mechanism between the Brussels municipalities that is built into the Mu-
nicipalities Fund, the redistribution of resources between rich and poor municipalities 
would increase.
In terms of administrative efficiency, the amalgamation of the smallest municipalities 
could also obviously be considered or a redistribution of powers between munici-
palities and Region, or even collaboration between municipalities on certain matters 
via intermunicipalities. Only the first option conflicts with the advantages of more, 
homogenously defined municipalities in the Region. Increasing the number of Brus-
sels municipalities does not prevent powers or new forms of intermunicipal collabo-
ration from being redrawn. However, it seems important to examine these proposals 
against the capacity of these institutions to guarantee redistribution at multiple 
scales.
2. An open region with a new solidary policy
Solidarity should not only be organised on the correct scale levels, but it should also 
have a political and social basis. Presently, Brussels is a divided city that lacks such 
a basis. Brussels is no longer an ethnically homogenous, bilingual city and the ex-
ternalisation of a Belgian nation. However, the city is also no longer imprisoned in a 
homogenous national culture that expects newcomers to integrate before receiving 
solidarity. This lack of national culture means that Brussels appears as an ‘open’ city 
to newcomers. Being incorporated in the urban community does not need to mean 
that one acculturalises or assimilates. Policy needs to adjust to this reality: instead of 
wanting to continue administering Brussels as a part of French-speaking Belgium or 
Flanders, the Brussels openness should be exploited and a resolute choice should 
be made for an international future.
However, openness also implies possibilities for a way out. Transnationality means 
that people can also quickly withdraw themselves from solidarity links in one place 
when they come out better in another place; situational solidarity is becoming less 
common and is often being substituted by solidarity within transnational networks. 
The cultural, institutional and socio-spatial structures make it perfectly possible to 
shut oneself off to the poverty and misery of other groups. How the population of 
Brussels, in all its diversity, can be encouraged to take part in solidarity and com-
mitment over and beyond group boundaries is an important challenge for the future, 
where classical recipes of social structure and social cohesion will not be sufficient.
3. Working on the future generation’s future
Solidarity will be essential for safeguarding the future of Brussels. The Brussels 
translational population is pre-eminently young and therefore forms the future of the 
city. However, an important number of these young people are also poor, receive 
insufficient schooling, are not able to find work and live in impoverished conditions. 
An open city not only has a cultural significance, but also means that everyone re-
ceives sufficient chances for personal development and for climbing up the social 
ladder. Training, employment and housing are therefore the key sectors.
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This means that Brussels politicians need to pay less attention to the quantitative 
aspects of job creation, and focus more on the quality of the jobs: which jobs do we 
want in Brussels for Brussels residents? This also calls for deliberate investment in a 
fundamental quality and affordability of housing and that gentrification, rather than 
being a threat to the poor inhabitants of the inner city, should be the basis of a redis-
tributive policy on a regional level. The combination of soft gentrification (in which 
newcomers share the diversity of the city with the existing population) and social 
housing development in the same neighbourhood offers perspectives for improving 
access to services including education. This type of social mix is a possible strategy 
for creating a basis for a balanced spatial distribution of services (collective con-
sumption) and equal access to these services. This would enable the social and 
ethnic segregation to be tackled in schools. The provision of good schooling and 
training, where multilingualism is seen as a trump card for an international city, 
where newcomers are actively taken care of and where equal opportunities are 
given as much attention as performance, are all essential for guaranteeing the 
openness of Brussels in the future.
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